The present study assessed the functional organization of action semantics by asking subjects to categorize pictures of an actor holding objects with a correct or incorrect grip at either a correct or incorrect goal location. Overall, reaction times were slower if the object was presented with an inappropriate posture, and this effect was stronger for goal violations compared with grip violations (Experiment 1). In addition, the retrieval of action semantics was found accompanied by the implicit activation of motor representations. Body-related objects (e.g., cup) were classified faster when a movement toward the subject's body was required, whereas world-related objects (e.g., pincers) were responded to faster with a movement in the opposite direction (Experiments 2 and 3) . In contrast, when subjects were required to retrieve only visual semantics (Experiment 4), no interference effects of postural information were observed, and motor representations were only partially activated. These findings suggest that action semantics can be accessed independently from visual semantics and that the retrieval of action semantics is supported by functional motor activation reflecting the prototypical use of an object.
In recent years a growing number of studies have shown at a behavioral as well as a brain level of investigation that action semantic knowledge about the use of objects relies on the activation of motor-related brain areas. At a behavioral level, it is typically found that observation of an object automatically triggers the appropriate handgrip for grasping the object (e.g., Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998) . For example, subjects are faster in categorization of a large object (e.g., an apple) when responding with a full grip compared with a small grip. In addition, it has been reported that subjects respond faster when making action decisions toward objects (e.g., do you perform a pour or a twist action with the object?) compared with contextual decisions (e.g., is the object found in the kitchen?), suggesting privileged access to action knowledge for objects (Chainay & Humphreys, 2002) . In a recent study, subjects were cued to make specific gestures that could be either volumetrically (grip used for lifting the object) or functionally (grip used for meaningful interaction with the object) congruent or incongruent with a visually presented object (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008) . Movements that were congruent with either the volumetric use (e.g., full grip toward calculator) or the functional use (e.g., pointing gesture toward calculator) of an object were initiated faster compared with movements that were unrelated to the object. Thus, observation of an object appears to automatically prime hand postures that allow actions at both a lower volumetrical level (i.e., object affordances) and a functional level (i.e., how to use the object purposefully).
The suggestion that the motor system is involved in action semantics receives further support from neuroimaging studies. Observation of manipulable objects consistently activates the ventral premotor cortex and the inferior parietal lobe (Boronat et al., 2005; Chao & Martin, 2000; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003) . These brain areas are known to be involved in object use and closely resemble areas in the monkey brain that are involved in object recognition. Single-cell recordings in monkeys have shown that canonical neurons in the premotor cortex (area F5) respond selectively to the visual presentation of graspable objects, probably reflecting an automatic coding of potential actions toward objects by the brain (Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001) . In addition, neurons in the anterior intraparietal area were found to respond selectively to the observation of objects of a particular size, shape, and orientation (Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000) , suggesting the involvement of a parietofrontal network in performing visuomotor transformations that allow interaction with objects.
However, in addition to coding the low-level action features of objects, an important aspect of action semantics consists in knowing what to do with objects. For example, a toothbrush may be grasped at either the brush or the handle, but only grasping the handle allows the meaningful use of the object. Accordingly, action semantics can be defined as knowing how to use objects and knowing what to do with objects (van Elk, van Schie, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2007) . Although most studies on action semantics have focused on low-level affordances that are triggered by the object (e.g., grip size), most manipulable objects are typically associated with a particular action goal or location (e.g., a toothbrush is typically moved toward the mouth).
Data from neuropsychological patients suggest that distinct neural systems are involved in the manipulation of objects (e.g., grasping of an object) and in knowing what to do with objects (e.g., demonstrating its use). Ideational apraxia is characterized by a loss of functional knowledge about object use (Ochipa, Rothi, & Heilman, 1989) . A patient showing ideational apraxia may be able to grasp an object correctly but may end up using it in the wrong fashion (e.g., combing hair with a toothbrush). In contrast, ideomotor apraxia refers to a deficit in handling objects, with preserved functional and semantic knowledge about an object (Buxbaum, Schwartz, & Carew, 1997; Buxbaum, Veramonti, & Schwartz, 2000) . For example, a patient with ideomotor apraxia may well be able to name a toothbrush and to tell what the object is normally used for, but when asked to use the object, the patient may end up wondering what movement to make with it. Thus, both aspects of object use (knowledge of its function and the ability to manipulate) are probably mediated by distinct neural systems. Lesion data suggest that temporal and frontal areas play an important role in the retrieval of functional knowledge, whereas parietal and premotor structures probably contribute to action performance (Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002) .
In line with the suggestion that functional and motor-related aspects of object manipulation can be selectively impaired, recent findings show that in object use immediate action goals (how to grasp an object) and final action goals (what to do with an object) are likely mediated by different neural systems. Planning and executing a movement on the basis of a precued grip (indicating which part of the object to be grasped) enhanced activation of the parieto-occipital sulcus supporting reaching and grasping toward visual targets (Majdandzic et al., 2007; . In contrast, planning and execution of a movement on the basis of its final goal (end position for transportation) enhanced activation in prefrontal brain areas (Majdandzic et al., 2007; supporting the actualization of more distant behavioral goals. Thus, actions can be planned at multiple levels of complexity, and different, although complementary, brain mechanisms are probably involved in the planning of immediate and final goals of an action.
Using an object in a coherent and meaningful way requires knowledge about both immediate action goals (i.e., selecting the appropriate grip for using an object) and final action goals (i.e., preparing to bring an object to its associated goal location). Moreover, in typical everyday actions, immediate action goals are most often selected to accomplish a more remote action outcome (e.g., drinking from a cup or cleaning a cup requires a different grasp). Rosenbaum (1991) reported the end state comfort effect, showing that objects are typically grasped with a posture that allows a comfortable end position. Thus, knowledge about final action goals (i.e., the associated end location of an object) is likely to be involved in the selection of more immediate action goals (i.e., the manner of grasping). However, still little is known about the interplay between immediate and final action goals and how they contribute to action semantics. In the present study we aimed to investigate the functional organization of action semantics and in particular the contribution of immediate and final action goals. Although typically the manner of grasping is considered as an immediate action goal and end location as a final action goal, throughout this article we refer to this distinction as goal-and grip-related aspects of action semantics. Accordingly, grip refers to the handgrip by which an object is grasped (e.g., full grip for grasping a cup), whereas goal refers to the final goal location to which an action is directed (e.g., mouth for grasping a cup to drink). To investigate the relative contribution of goal-and griprelated aspects to action semantics, we used an action observation setting in which subjects observed pictures of an actor using an object. As target objects we chose objects that are typically used near the body (e.g., microphone; hereafter referred to as bodyrelated objects), and as filler items we chose objects that are typically used away from the body (e.g., pincers; hereafter referred to as world-related objects). For body-related objects, the displayed action could be correct or incorrect with respect to the goal and the grip applied to the object, resulting in four stimulus categories (see Figure 1 ): pictures representing an actor (a) using the object in a correct fashion, (b) grasping the object with an inappropriate grip, (c) holding the object at the wrong goal near the face, or (d) grasping the object with an inappropriate grip and holding the object at a wrong goal.
Recent studies show that observation of incorrect actions results in slower reaction times when subjects make action-related decisions about objects (Bach, Knoblich, Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 2005; Yoon & Humphreys, 2005) . For example, when a hammer was grasped with an odd handgrip, subjects were slower to decide whether the hammer could be used for chopping (Yoon & Humphreys, 2005) . Furthermore, Bach et al. (2005) asked subjects to attend to the correctness of either spatial (e.g., orientation of a key near a lock) or functional (relation between different objects; e.g., either a key or a screwdriver near a lock) aspects of an observed
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Incorrect grip Figure 1 . Stimuli used in Experiments 1-4 depicting an actor using body-and world-related objects in an appropriate or inappropriate fashion.
action. Both a spatial and a functional mismatch (e.g., key with wrong orientation or screwdriver near lock) resulted in slower reaction times, indicating that both spatial and functional aspects of an observed action are automatically processed. In a similar fashion, we hypothesized that observation of an incorrect action at either the level of action goals or the level of action grips should interfere with action-related decisions. Action semantic knowledge about objects was activated by asking subjects to perform a categorization task, deciding for each object whether it would typically be moved toward the body (e.g., microphone) or away from the body (e.g., pair of pincers), by pressing one of two buttons. If accessing action semantic information about an object involves activating grip-or goal-related action features, we should expect interference from observing appropriate and inappropriate usage of the object. Accordingly, we anticipated slower reaction times to pictures showing an object with an incorrect grip or at an incorrect goal (cf. Bach et al., 2005; Yoon & Humphreys, 2005) . Moreover, following the assumption that knowledge about final action goals determines the selection of more immediate action goals, we expected relative larger consequences for incorrect goals compared with incorrect grips.
Experiment 1
Method
Sixteen subjects (9 women, 7 men; mean age 22.1 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were tested in the experiment. All subjects were students at the Radboud University of Nijmegen, and all but one person declared themselves to be righthanded. Participants received an experimental fee (€6) or course credits for participation.
Stimuli were obtained by taking photographs of a male actor holding objects at different locations near the face (e.g., cup near the mouth, ear, or eye). Care was taken that the facial expression, gaze direction, and body position of the actor were comparable across pictures. Fourteen objects were chosen that are typically brought toward the face (body-related objects; e.g., microphone, helmet; see Table 1 ) and 14 filler objects unrelated to the face (world-related objects; e.g., pincers, salad bowl) that matched the body-related objects in general shape and size. World-related objects were included as filler items to allow a semantic categorization that required subjects to access action semantic information for each object.
To assess both goal-related (the location on the face) and griprelated aspects of object use (the selected handgrip to hold the object), for each body-related object four pictures were taken (see Figure 1 ). Accordingly, pictures could be classified as representing (a) appropriate object use (correct goal and correct grip; e.g., microphone with normal grip near mouth), (b) correct goal and incorrect grip (e.g., microphone with odd grip near mouth), (c) incorrect goal and correct grip (e.g., microphone with normal grip near ear), and (d) incorrect goal and incorrect grip (e.g., microphone with odd grip near ear). For each world-related object a picture was taken in which the actor's body posture matched the pictures for the corresponding body-related objects. Because world-related objects were always shown near the face, they were always used in an incorrect fashion in terms of their final goal. In contrast, the grip applied to world-related objects could be correct or incorrect.
The actor grasped all objects with the right hand. Left-handed action pictures were obtained by flipping each picture along a vertical axis, resulting in a total of 224 pictures (28 objects ϫ 4 body postures ϫ left-or right-handed actor). Left-and righthanded action pictures were presented in separate blocks, and within each block all 112 stimuli were randomly presented. Pictures were presented at a resolution of 1024 ϫ 768 pixels on a 19-in. (48.26-cm) computer display at a viewing distance of 80 cm, resulting in approximately 13 visual degrees. Each stimulus was preceded by a 1,500-ms fixation cross, and pictures remained on the screen until a response had been made. Response onsets were sampled at a rate of 1,000 Hz. The experiment was programmed with Presentation (Version 11.0.03; Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA).
Before the experiment started, pictures of single objects without an actor were shown, and subjects were asked to name each object. If the subject did not know the name of the object, the experimenter told the participant the correct object name. In this way we ensured that participants would recognize all objects and their function. Subsequently, subjects were told that they were going to see pictures of an actor using the objects. Their task was to decide whether the objects presented in the action pictures would typically be moved toward the face. Responses could be made with a left-or right-hand button press. The assignment of response mapping (yes or no) was counterbalanced between different blocks. In the instruction it was never mentioned that in some pictures objects would be used in an odd fashion. Each block started with a short practice run of 14 trials in which the subject familiarized with the task. None of the subjects reported having difficulty deciding whether he or she would bring the objects toward the face.
Results
The analysis of the categorization of objects revealed that subjects agreed widely over the actions associated with the objects. On average subjects made categorization errors in 3.8% of all trials. Inspection of errors revealed no particular object to be ambiguous with respect to classification of the associated action. Therefore all objects were included in the analysis.
For analysis of reaction times, trials in which the subject made a categorization error and reaction times that exceeded the subject's mean by more than two standard deviations were excluded from analysis. Reaction time data to the body-related objects are represented in Figure 2 , and Table 2 presents the reaction time analysis of variance (ANOVA) results. Differences between stimulus categories for body-related objects were assessed with a 2 ϫ 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Goal (correct or incorrect) and Grip (correct or incorrect). For body-related objects, a main effect of Goal, F(1, 15) ϭ 57.4, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .80, was reflected in slower reaction times to pictures in which the object was held at an incorrect goal location (673 ms) compared with pictures in which the object was held at the correct goal location (637 ms; difference ϭ 36 ms). In addition, a main effect of Grip was found, F(1, 15) ϭ 15.3, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .51, reflected in slower reaction times to pictures in which the object was grasped with an incorrect grip (663 ms) compared with a correct grip (646 ms; difference ϭ 17 ms). No interaction was found between Grip and Goal (F Ͻ 1). For world-related objects, no significant difference was found between correct and incorrect grips, F(1, 15) ϭ 1.2, p ϭ .28, 2 ϭ .08. In general, subjects were faster in categorization of body-related objects (644 ms) than of world-related objects (668 ms), F(1, 15) ϭ 16.1, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .52.
Discussion
In Experiment 1 subjects were slower in action categorization when objects were presented with an inappropriate body posture. The strongest delay in reaction times was found when subjects responded to pictures representing a goal violation (holding an object near an incorrect goal location on the face). In addition, reaction times were slower when objects were held with an incorrect grip. Reaction time effects reflecting the inappropriateness of an observed action seem to be additive, with the slowest reaction times when both the grip and the goal of the action are incorrect. World-related objects were always presented at a wrong goal location and were categorized slower than body-related objects independent of the correctness of the grips. In general, these findings suggest that accessing action semantic knowledge about an object is facilitated (or inhibited) by the concomitant presentation of its correct (or incorrect) use at both the level of the grip applied to an object and the level of the final goal.
Accessing action semantics is believed to rely on motor representations, supporting the retrieval of both functional and manipulative aspects of object use (Bach et al., 2005; Boronat et al., 2005; Kellenbach et al., 2003) . Therefore, a straightforward explanation for the present findings is that subjects relied on motor representations for classifying objects and that reaction time effects reflect the (in)congruency between stored and displayed motor representations of the objects' use. To investigate this hypothesis, we conducted a second experiment in which a methodology was adopted that is used successfully in language-oriented studies that investigate motor resonance supporting language comprehension. Note. RT ϭ reaction time; MT ϭ movement time.
Language-oriented studies have suggested the involvement of the motor system in language comprehension on the basis of specific behavioral measures (e.g., Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002) . A typical finding is that subjects are faster in making a movement in the direction that is implied by a sentence (e.g., faster responding by moving toward the body when reading "Open the drawer"). This has been taken as evidence that motor-related processes support or ground language comprehension. In a similar fashion, it may be that accessing the functional or goal-directed properties of objects or tools is supported by activating motor representations associated with the object. For example, the categorization of body-related objects might rely on the activation of a motor program that is associated with object use (e.g., bringing the object toward a specific part of the face). More specifically, if object classification relies on motor-related activity, an interaction between response direction (toward or away from the body) and object identity (body-or world-related objects) is expected, comparable to the action sentence congruency effect for sentences implying movements in a particular direction. The possibility that subjects relied on activating motor representations for object classification was investigated in a second experiment, in which instead of left-and right-button presses, subjects categorized objects by making a movement toward or away from the body.
Experiment 2
Method
For the second experiment 24 subjects (16 women, 8 men; mean age 22.5 years) were recruited who did not take part in Experiment 1. All subjects were students of the Radboud University of Nijmegen, and all declared themselves to be right-handed. All subjects received a small experimental fee (€6) or course credits for participation.
The experimental design was similar to that of the first experiment. However, instead of aligning the response-button box to the subjects' left and right hands, we rotated the box 90°to allow subjects to make responses in the sagittal plane. More precisely, subjects were instructed to place their dominant hand on a center start button and to make responses by pressing a button situated either toward or away from their body. Half the subjects were instructed to respond to objects that are typically moved toward the face by pressing the button closest to them and to world-related objects by pressing the button located farthest away (body related ϭ toward). The other half were instructed to respond to body-related objects by pressing the button located away from them and vice versa for world-related objects (body related ϭ away). During instructions we carefully avoided using words like toward and away to keep the relation between movement direction and object category implicit. Subjects were instructed to start their response when they were certain in which direction they were going to move their hands to avoid premature releases. Movement times were calculated by taking the difference between the moment of pressing the button located near or far from the body and the time of stimulus onset.
Results
Incorrect responses were made in 3.6% of all trials. Missing responses in which subjects failed to press the button located near or away from the body occurred in 0.7% of all trials. Misses, incorrect trials, and trials in which the response or movement time exceeded the subject's mean by more than two standard deviations were excluded from analysis.
Reaction times in response to body-related objects, which are comparable to the results from Experiment 1, are presented in Figure 3A , and Table 2 presents the reaction time ANOVA results. For body-related objects, a main effect of Goal, F(1, 23) ϭ 18.6, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .45, was reflected in slower reaction times to objects being presented at an incorrect (650 ms) compared with a correct goal (619 ms; difference ϭ 31 ms). In addition, a main effect of Grip, F(1, 23) ϭ 5.9, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .20, was reflected in slower reaction times to objects that were grasped with an incorrect (644 ms) compared with a correct grip (625 ms; difference ϭ 19 ms). No significant interaction effect was found between Goal and Grip, F(1, 23) ϭ 2.9, p ϭ .10, 2 ϭ .11 For world-related objects, no significant difference was found between correct and incorrect grips, F(1, 23) ϭ 2.2, p ϭ .15, 2 ϭ .09. In contrast to the results from Experiment 1, no significant difference was found in reaction times between body-related (634 ms) and world-related objects (632 ms; F Ͻ 1).
The total movement times (time between stimulus onset and pressing the button located near or far from the body) for body- and world-related objects are represented in Figure 3B . Two analyses were conducted on the movement data. First, in the subject analysis we focused on the average movement time across all objects for body-and world-related objects within body-relatedequals-toward and body-related-equals-away conditions. Movement times were subjected to an ANOVA with Condition (congruent: body related ϭ toward vs. incongruent: body related ϭ away) as the between-subjects factor and Object (body related vs. world related) as the within-subjects factor. Movement time ANOVA results are presented in Table 2 . A main effect of Condition indicated that subjects in the congruent condition showed faster response latencies (916 ms) than subjects in the incongruent condition (972 ms), F1(1, 22) ϭ 4.9, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .18. The interaction between Condition and Object reflects that movement times toward body-and world-related objects differed between subjects in congruent and incongruent conditions, F1(1, 22) ϭ 4.5, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .20. Post hoc analysis with t tests revealed a significant difference between congruent and incongruent conditions for body-related objects, t(22) ϭ 2.6, p Ͻ .05, indicating faster responses toward than away from the body. For worldrelated objects, the difference between congruent and incongruent conditions did not reach statistical significance, t(22) ϭ Ϫ1.7, p ϭ .10.
Second, in an item analysis, we investigated whether the action congruency effect was consistent across different objects. The average movement times associated with each of the 28 individual objects were calculated by averaging across participants. Importantly, a highly significant interaction effect was found between Movement (toward and away) and Object (body related vs. world related), F2(1, 13) ϭ 21.3, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .62, suggesting that the action congruency effect was consistent across all object pairs. In addition, a main effect of action, F2(1, 13) ϭ 8.5, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .39, reflects that objects were classified faster by means of movement toward the body (933 ms) than by movement away from the body (955 ms).
Discussion
In Experiment 2 findings from the first experiment were replicated by showing that subjects' reaction times were slower to pictures in which an object was held at an incorrect goal location or grasped with an incorrect grip. In addition, we tested the hypothesis that subjects may have relied on motor activation for classifying objects as body or world related. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that subjects showed faster movement times to body-related objects with a movement toward their body, whereas the reverse was true for world-related objects (e.g., pincers), to which subjects responded faster by making a movement away from the body. These findings suggest that action semantics about an object are activated in association with a functional motor program, reflecting the normal usage of the object.
However, because a between-subjects design was used, there is a possibility that the response mapping for subjects in the congruent condition (body toward and world away) might be easier to activate and remember than for subjects in the incongruent condition (body away and world toward). In other words, the congruent response mapping is probably more familiar than the incongruent mapping (e.g., a cup is most often brought toward the mouth), and on the basis of this association the subject's task in the congruent condition may have been easier. To exclude the possibility that differences in task difficulty caused the action congruency effects and not the covert activation of a motor program, we conducted a third experiment in which congruent and incongruent response mappings were alternated from trial to trial.
Experiment 3
Method
In the third experiment 18 right-handed subjects (15 women, 3 men; mean age 20.3 years) were tested. None of the subjects had participated in the previous experiments. Three subjects considered themselves to be left-handed. Data from 2 subjects were excluded from analysis because in more than 35% of all trials objects were categorized incorrectly.
The same stimuli were used as in the first three experiments, in which an actor used objects in a correct or incorrect fashion (see Figure 1 ). Subjects were instructed to respond to the question whether they would typically bring the presented object toward their face. The experimental procedure is represented in Figure 4 . Each trial started with the presentation of a letter (A or B) to indicate with which button the subject had to respond to indicate . Experimental design as used in Experiment 4. A letter indicated by which button subjects were required to respond to body-related objects. Subsequently a picture representing an actor using the object was presented, and responses toward or away from the body were performed.
the presentation of a body-related object. Following the letter, a picture from the same stimulus set that was used in the previous experiments appeared on the screen, to which the subject responded by releasing the central button and pressing the button located near or far from the body, depending on the type of object. If the object would typically be brought toward the body, subjects responded by pressing the button indicated by the letter. In contrast, if a world-related object was presented, subjects responded by pressing the button opposite to the letter indicated at the beginning of the trial. After carefully explaining the experimental procedure, we ran a total of 14 practice trials.
Results
Incorrect categorization of the object occurred in 3.9% of all trials. Missing responses were detected in less than 0.1% of all trials. Incorrect responses or trials in which the response or movement time exceeded the subject's mean by more than two standard deviations were excluded from analysis.
Reaction time data to body-related objects, which are comparable to the data from the first two experiments, are represented in Figure 5A , and Table 2 presents the reaction time ANOVA results. For body-related objects, a main effect of Goal, F(1, 15) ϭ 13.6, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .48, was reflected in slower reaction times to pictures in which the object was presented at an incorrect (852 ms) compared with a correct goal (805 ms; difference ϭ 47 ms). In addition, a marginally significant main effect of Grip, F(1, 15) ϭ 4.4, p ϭ .053, 2 ϭ .23, was reflected in slower reaction times to pictures in which an incorrect (843 ms) compared with a correct grip (813 ms; difference ϭ 30 ms) was applied to the object. No interaction between Goal and Grip was observed (F Ͻ 1). No significant difference was found for world-related objects between correct and incorrect grips (F Ͻ 1). In general, subjects responded faster to body-related (827 ms) than to world-related objects (853 ms), F(1, 15) ϭ 15.8, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .51. Movement times are represented in Figure 5B , and movement time ANOVA results are presented in Table 2 . For the subject analysis (movement times averaged across all objects), a main effect of Object is indicated in faster reaction times for bodyrelated (1,193 ms) compared with world-related objects (1,272 ms), F1(1, 15) ϭ 20.3, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .57. Importantly, a significant interaction was found between Object (body or world related) and Movement (toward or away from the body), F1(1, 15) ϭ 5.9, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .28. Post hoc t tests revealed a significant difference for world-related objects between movement times toward (1,327 ms) and movement times away from the body (1,217 ms), t(15) ϭ 2.9, p Ͻ .05. For body-related objects, the difference between movement times toward (1,148 ms) and movement times away from the body (1,238 ms) was reversed but did not reach statistical significance, t(15) ϭ Ϫ1.8, p ϭ .09. The item analysis (movement times averaged across participants) revealed a significant interaction between Object (body or world related) and Movement (toward or away from the body), F2(1, 13) ϭ 4.9, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .32, suggesting that the action congruency effect was consistent across different objects. In addition, a main effect of Object, F2(1, 13) ϭ 8.4, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .57, reflects faster movement times to body-related (1,222 ms) compared with worldrelated objects (1,272 ms).
Discussion
Reaction time data from Experiment 3 are consistent with data from the previous experiments. Observation of an object being grasped with an incorrect grip or at an incorrect goal interfered strongly with categorization of objects as body or world related. Subjects were slower in categorization of world-related compared with body-related objects, which probably reflects the fact that for world-related objects subjects had to switch from the indicated response button to the opposite button.
Importantly, in Experiment 3 the action congruency effect was replicated with a within-subjects design in which the response mapping varied from trial to trial. Subjects were faster in making a movement away from their body than toward their body when classifying world-related objects. Whereas in the second experiment the action congruency effect may have been confounded with effects of task difficulty or familiarity, present findings convincingly established the reliability of the action congruency effect when accessing semantic knowledge about objects.
However, in all experiments discussed thus far the object categorization task had a very strong motor component. Subjects were explicitly required to categorize objects on the basis of their associated actions ("Do you typically move the object toward your body?"), which may have encouraged subjects to covertly simulate the action associated with the object. An interesting question is whether postural interference effects occur only in the context of deliberate processing of action knowledge, or whether similar effects may also be observed for a semantic task wherein the processing of action relevant information is not required. It is interesting that in several previous studies we found that action semantics were activated only when subjects intended to use an object purposefully but not when they were required to make an action-irrelevant spatial categorization response (Lindemann, Stenneken, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2006) . These findings suggest that action semantics are not automatically activated upon object presentation but need to be actively retrieved via the meaningful use of objects. In a similar fashion, it could well be that the postural interference effects found in the present study reflect the selective retrieval of action semantics because subjects needed to activate the prototypical actions associated with objects. To investigate whether the effects found in the first three experiments require the deliberate processing of action information, we conducted a fourth experiment in which subjects made an actionunrelated semantic categorization about the objects. Rather than have subjects categorize objects on the basis of their associated action, we instructed subjects to decide whether an object was made of plastic.
Experiment 4
Method
The stimuli used in the previous experiments were classified according to whether the object was made of plastic (see Table 1 ). Subjects were instructed to decide whether the object presented was made of plastic. Each trial started with a short task cue indicating with which button subjects should respond if the object was made of plastic. If the object was not made of plastic, subjects should respond with the opposite response button. Next, a picture appeared on the screen representing an object being grasped in a correct or incorrect fashion (same stimuli used as in the first three experiments). After subjects responded by making a movement toward or away from the body, the next trial was initiated after subjects had returned to the starting position.
Results
For the fourth experiment, 16 subjects (10 women, 6 men; mean age 21.5 years) were tested who did not participate in any of the previous experiments. To classify subjects' responses as correct or incorrect, we calculated the consistency per subject. Each object was presented four times, and if subjects were consistent in their classification of the object, they should always classify the object as either made of plastic or not. If subjects were ambiguous in the classification of the object, the object was excluded from further analysis. On average subjects showed ambiguous responses toward 13% of all objects (3.6 out of 28 objects). Trials with ambiguous objects or trials exceeding the subject's mean reaction time by more than two standard deviations were excluded from analysis.
Reaction times to body-related objects are represented in Figure 6A , and Table 2 presents the reaction time ANOVA results. Analysis of reaction times with a 2 (Goal: correct vs. incorrect) ϫ 2 (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated measures ANOVA did not reveal significant effects (all Fs Ͻ 1). Subjects responded faster to world-related (973 ms) than to body-related objects (988 ms), F(1, 15) ϭ 11.9, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .44. For world-related objects, no significant difference was found between objects being grasped with a correct grip (963 ms) and objects being grasped with an incorrect grip (951 ms), F(1, 15) ϭ 0.16, p ϭ .69, 2 ϭ .01. Movement times are represented in Figure 6B , and movement time ANOVA results are presented in Table 2 . Analysis of the movement times averaged across all objects revealed a significant interaction between Object (body or world related) and Movement (movement toward or away from the body), F1(1, 15) ϭ 5.1, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .25. Post hoc t tests did show a marginally significant difference between movements directed toward and movements directed away from the body for world-related objects only, t(15) ϭ 2.1, p ϭ .06, indicating faster movements away from the body (1,229 ms) than toward the body (1,242 ms). For bodyrelated objects, no significant difference was found between movements directed toward (1,229 ms) and movements directed away from the body (1,242 ms), t(15) ϭ Ϫ0.80, p ϭ .42. In the item analysis, statistical analysis of the movement times averaged across all subjects did not reveal a significant interaction between Object (body or world related) and Movement (toward or away from the body), F(1, 13) ϭ 1.14, p ϭ .31, 2 ϭ .08.
Discussion
In Experiment 4 subjects made a semantic decision about objects, deciding whether an object was made of plastic. In contrast to the results from previous experiments, no significant effects of the correct or incorrect posture were found on the subjects' semantic categorization response. Only when subjects were explicitly required to retrieve action semantics, observation of incorrect goals or incorrect grips interfered (Experiments 1-3). Visual postural information, however, did not affect semantic decisions about the material of an object. These findings suggest that visual or semantic knowledge of object properties may be accessed independently from action semantic information. Apparently, action semantic knowledge is not activated automatically with object recognition but only when there is a specific task requirement to do so. These findings are consistent with those of Lindemann et al. (2006) , who showed that action semantic information about an object's use was activated only with the specific intention to use the object meaningfully. The current study suggests that action semantics are activated during action observation as well, only when subjects are required to simulate the prototypical action associated with an object.
General Discussion
The present study indicates that accessing action semantic information about an object's use is supported by activating covert motor representations that represent the typical functional use of that object. Two complementary lines of evidence were presented in support of this view. First, subjects' semantic categorization was slowed down when objects were held in a manner that differed from their normal use, with respect to both the grip that was used on the object and the goal location to which the object was directed. Second, an action congruency effect was found between the typical response direction that is associated with using an object (e.g., a cup is typically moved to the mouth) and the actual movement required from the subject (e.g., a movement toward the body). We discuss these effects below in more detail.
First, we consider the effects that resulted from presenting objects with an appropriate or inappropriate manner of usage. The first three experiments successfully demonstrated interference from inappropriate use of objects on the subjects' ability to classify objects. We used pictures of body-related objects as target stimuli and manipulated the correctness of the goal and the grip applied to the object. World-related objects were included as filler items to allow a categorization response by the subjects. Because all objects were presented near the face, world-related objects were always used in an incorrect fashion. Accordingly, it is difficult to compare reaction time effects of postural information for world-related objects to reaction time effects for body-related objects. It is interesting that both goal-and grip-related violations significantly slowed down subjects' semantic categorization responses for body-related objects. These results give empirical support for the theoretical proposal (van Elk et al., 2007) that action semantics can be defined in terms of action goals (what to use an object for) and action means (how to use an object). Action means refers to the manner in which an object is handled (i.e., grasped) or, more generally, the way in which we preferably interact with an object (e.g., a toothbrush is grasped at the handle, not at the brush). Action goals, in contrast, refers to the purpose or intent for which an object is used (e.g., a toothbrush is used for brushing teeth).
It is interesting that reaction time effects of both goal-and grip-related violations of action semantics seem to be additive, with the strongest interference occurring when an object is grasped with an incorrect grip at an incorrect goal location. This could suggest that goal-and grip-related aspects of an observed action to some extent are relatively independently processed. In accordance with this suggestion, recent findings from an action observation study showed that the selective processing of grips and goals calls upon different brain areas (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008) . More specifically, unusual intentions (observation of an object at an incorrect goal location) evoked greater activity in the inferior frontal gyrus, part of the mirror neuron system, whereas actions that were carried out with an unusual grip evoked greater activity bilaterally in the lateral occipito-temporal cortex, around the putative extrastriate body area (de Lange et al., 2008) , suggesting the existence of specialized functions for processing specific aspects of meaningful behavior (e.g., goals and means) individually.
In line with the proposed dominance of action goals relative to action means in the planning and observation of meaningful object use (Rosenbaum, Vaughan, Barnes, & Jorgensen, 1992; van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2008) , we found that objects presented at an incorrect goal location resulted in a stronger increase in reaction times than objects presented with an incorrect grip. Furthermore, in Experiments 1 and 3 subjects were slower to respond to worldrelated than to body-related objects, suggesting that action identification was more difficult for world-related objects, which were always presented at an incorrect goal location. These results suggest that subjects were more sensitive to violations of the action goal to which an object was directed than to violations in the specific manner of grasping the object. It is interesting that these findings correspond to those of behavioral studies that reported dominance of action goals over action means in the planning of actions with objects (Rosenbaum et al., 1992; Weigelt, Kunde, & Prinz, 2006) . Our findings suggest that a similar dominance could exist at an action semantic level in which stored knowledge of an object's use is organized primarily around what to do with an object.
It is interesting that interference effects of goal-or grip-related violations were found only when subjects categorized objects on the basis of their associated action (Experiments 1-3). When subjects decided whether an object was made of plastic, no interference of postural information on the categorization response was found (Experiment 4). Thereby it seems unlikely that interference effects of goal-or grip-related violations arise at a purely perceptual level, as a result of integrating the object with the action context presented (Green & Hummel, 2006) . Rather, the present findings indicate a selective interference of postural information only when subjects were explicitly required to activate action semantic representations about objects or imagine the object's use. According to this view, the interference effects observed in the first three experiments probably reflect a mismatch between observed actions and action semantic representations retrieved from memory.
This interpretation is in line with a dual-route account according to which action knowledge can be retrieved via a direct route from object perception to action, whereas semantic knowledge about an object is accessed via a semantic route (e.g., Humphreys & Riddoch, 2001 ). Evidence for a dissociation between processing semantic-and action-related properties of objects is obtained from both clinical and experimental studies. For example, patients with optic aphasia perform badly on naming tasks to visually presented objects but show relatively intact performance on pantomiming object use (Beauvois, 1982) . In contrast, patients with visual apraxia fail to make the appropriate gesture to visually presented objects but are often able to name objects. Optic aphasics likely have a deficit in the route from object perception to semantics with a spared direct route from object perception to action, whereas visual apraxic patients have intact access to semantic knowledge but the route from object perception to action is impaired (Riddoch, Humphreys, & Price, 1989 ). In addition, behavioral studies show that making an action decision about an object (e.g., "Is the object used for chopping?") is strongly affected by irrelevant postural information, whereas making a semantic decision (e.g., "Is the name of the object axe?") is not (Yoon & Humphreys, 2005) . In a similar fashion, in the present study action-related categorizations were found affected by irrelevant postural information (Experiment 1-3), whereas action-unrelated semantic decisions were not (Experiment 4).
The above findings suggest that action semantics are activated selectively in accordance with the preparation of a meaningful action for execution (Lindemann et al., 2006) or via observation of actions of another person. We speculated that in the case of action observation, motor representations are activated during the perception of an action and that reaction time effects reflect the (in)congruency between stored and activated motor representations of the object's use. In line with this suggestion, Manthey, Schubotz, and von Cramon (2003) found that motor cortical areas respond differently to movies in which objects were either manipulated correctly, used in a semantically incorrect fashion (e.g., adding salt to coffee), or manipulated in an incorrect fashion (e.g., pouring water beside a glass). In addition, in a recent study a stronger activation of premotor areas was found for observation of incorrect compared with correct actions (Koelewijn, van Schie, Bekkering, Oostenveld, & Jensen, 2008) . These results are consistent with the idea that motor involvement in action observation could reflect a system that matches observed actions onto stored motor representations and that this matching process underlies our ability to recognize the actions that we observe (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) .
In accordance with the suggestion that motor resonance underlies the classification of objects in body-and world-related categories, an action congruency effect was found when movements had to be made in the sagittal plane, toward or away from the body. In Experiments 2 and 3, subjects were faster to respond to bodyrelated objects (e.g., comb) by making a movement toward their body and to world-related objects (e.g., pincers) by making a movement away from their body. These findings are in line with previous studies that have found priming of action features (e.g., grip aperture) during identification of objects (Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998) . Importantly, however, whereas the results of previous studies can often be explained on the basis of the physical affordances of objects (e.g., a small object evokes a small hand aperture), no such explanation is possible for the action congruency effect reported here. That is, the typical movement direction that is used for an object cannot be identified on the basis of the physical properties of the object but requires access of action semantics. More specifically, the present results suggest that by retrieving the action semantics of body-and world-related objects, subjects activated a motor representation of their typical use that either interfered or concurred with the required direction of response.
Together the present findings indicate that accessing action semantics about objects is directly influenced by the concomitant presentation of a correct or incorrect posture applied to the object. Observation of an incorrect posture applied to an object (holding the object with a wrong grip or at an odd goal location) interfered strongly with the retrieval of action semantics (Experiments 1-3) , probably owing to a conflict between stored and displayed actions. In sum, both the interference effect of incorrect postures and the action congruency effect support the view that action semantic knowledge about objects consists of motor representations organized around specific end postures.
However, when only semantic information needed to be retrieved (Experiment 4), no interference effects of action context on the categorization response were found. These findings suggest that action semantics can be accessed relatively independently from visual semantics. Thereby the present findings are in line with a dual-route account according to which action knowledge or semantic knowledge can be selectively activated, and only in case action knowledge is accessed, interference effects of irrelevant postural information are expected (cf. Yoon & Humphreys, 2005) . In line with this suggestion, strong action congruency effects were observed only when subjects were explicitly required to access action knowledge (Experiments 2 and 3). For example, activating action knowledge about a cup facilitated movements directed toward the body, thereby guiding the action toward the end posture that is typically associated with drinking. When the task involved an action-unrelated semantic decision, only a marginally significant action congruency effect was found (Experiment 4). The small action congruency effect found in the fourth experiment may reflect the direct activation of action representations associated with the object via a direct route from object perception to action (cf. Riddoch et al., 1989) . Although dependent on task instructions, action semantics to some extent may partially be coactivated upon object perception. Patients with utilization behavior likely have difficulty with controlling these automatic action tendencies associated with objects (Archibald, Mateer, & Kerns, 2001 ). When patients with this disorder are presented with an object, they automatically start to use the object in a prototypical fashion (e.g., start to brush their teeth when presented with a toothbrush), suggesting that functional aspects of object use can be activated automatically.
It is interesting that recent studies in primates suggest that part of the motor system may be organized in a posture-based fashion, allowing the elicitation of complex behaviorally meaningful movements (Graziano, Taylor, & Moore, 2002) . The prolonged stimulation of premotor cortex at a specific site resulted in a coordinated eating action sequence, consisting of hand grasping, mouth opening, and subsequent arm movement directed toward the mouth. These complex movements were elicited independent of the starting position of the arm, and stimulation at different sites resulted in the elicitation of different behaviorally meaningful actions (e.g., eating, displaying fear behavior). These findings suggest that in primates meaningful actions may be represented in the motor system that is organized around specific body postures. In a similar fashion, it could well be that in humans the action semantic knowledge about objects and tools is strongly associated with specific motor representations that elicit the default body posture used for that object. In the present study, the interference of body posture with action semantic categorization and the action congruency effect provide preliminary support for the view that action semantics are represented in the motor system, consisting of specific motor representations that support meaningful actions with an object.
In conclusion, both the interference of incorrect object use with semantic categorization and the action congruency effect suggest that motor representations support the retrieval of action semantics. More specifically, the suggestion that knowledge about the meaningful use of objects may be organized around specific body postures, specifying the typical goal location of objects, calls for further investigation to elucidate underlying neural mechanisms.
